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Distance related variables typically vary in a cross-section dimension but less so in a time 
dimension across cities, regions, or countries. The enlargement of the EU or the introduction 
of the euro, however, can be looked upon as integration shocks that are informative of the 
consequences of changes in distance over time. Border cities or regions are thought to be 
more affected by these shocks than more central locations because of the larger impact of 
changes in the transaction costs that go along with EU integration along the border. Both at 
the urban and regional level, we find a beneficial influence of the EU integration process as 
measured by the growth in population share along the integration borders, leading to an extra 
growth rate of about 0.15 percentage points per annum. The positive integration holds on both 
sides of the integration border, is active for a limited distance (up to 70km) and time period 
(up to 30 years), and is particularly important for large cities and regions. Despite the positive 
EU integration effect, being located along a border remains a burden in view of the (larger) 
negative general border effect. We do not find similar positive border-integration effects as a 
result of the introduction of the euro. 
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1  Introduction 
Systems of cities change slowly over time and appear to be stable over long periods. 
This stability has often been observed by urban historians.
2 However, subsets of cities 
do evolve over time, following changes in the economy, institutional changes or 
technological developments (Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). These evolutions 
can take decades, or even centuries (Bairoch, 1988). This time dimension creates 
practical difficulties in analyzing the ultimate causes of changes in city systems as 
consistent data for many countries and a sufficiently large number of cities over a 
long time period are not readily available, see Bosker et al (2008) for an exception. 
 
Only relatively recently have discretionary policy changes or (quasi-)natural 
experiments been used to shed light on what drives changes in the development of 
(systems of) cities and to investigate stability of the system after a shock. Davis and 
Weinstein (2002), for instance, analyze the consequences of the allied bombing of 
Japanese cities during World War II (WWII). A similar exercise was performed by 
Brakman, Garretsen and Schramm (2004) for the bombing of German cities by allied 
forces during the same period. These studies show that the development of cities 
follows indeed a relatively stable path, in the sense that cities tend to return to their 
pre-shock path following the shock. At the same time, it is possible that the 
development of cities leap-frogs to another development path, see Bosker et al., 
(2007). Some less dramatic experiments, however, like changes in the degree of 
economic integration, illustrate that the effects for notably border cities, can be 
substantial. Hanson (2001, 2004) shows that the integration process between Mexico 
and the USA accounts for a sizeable portion of employment growth in U.S. border 
cities over the sample period. The opposite of integration is segregation. Redding and 
Sturm (2008) analyze the effects on border cities along the new border following the 
post WWII division of Germany into East and West Germany in 1949. They, like 
Hanson (2001), find that the effects on (west) German cities along the newly created 
intra-German border are substantial; traditionally centrally located cities suddenly 
found themselves in the periphery of Germany, resulting in a sharp decline of the 
population (more so for small than for large border cities). At an even more 
disaggregated scale, Ahfeldt et al. (2010) show for the case of the Berlin Wall and the 
                                          
2 Hohenberg (2004, p. 3051) notes that ‘[t]aking both the resistance and the resilience of cities together, 
it is perhaps not surprising that the European system should rest so heavily on places many centuries 
old, despite the enormous increase in the urban population and the transformation in urban economies’. The positive border effect of EU integration 
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city of Berlin, that also within a city a division (and subsequent reunification) can lead 
to remarkable changes with respect to the economic structure of a city, especially 
along borders.  
 
Border cities are of special interest in the wake of these integration shocks, because 
these cities experience more drastic changes in their so-called market access (see 
below) than more central cities (Hanson, 2005).
3 The enlargement of the European 
Union (EU) and the introduction of the euro can be looked upon as two policy-
induced, integration that shed light on the consequences of changes in market access 
in other EU markets. Central to our paper is the notion that cities or regions that are 
close to the border are the most affected by these changes in EU integration , as they 
are especially confronted with changes in market access, whereas the effects for cities 
or regions further away from the border are more subdued.  
 
Our paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we summarize the two EU integration  
experiments,  EU enlargement and the introduction of the euro), that we analyze in the 
remainder of the paper. Based on Redding and Sturm (2008), section 3 provides the 
theoretical background. Section 4 describes the data and section 5 introduces the 
central empirical specification. The general benefits of our approach are that (i) we 
can focus on the consequences of economic integration for cities and regions, (ii) our 
results are most likely not affected by other aspects such as changes in natural 
resources or climatic changes, and (iii) we have a sufficiently large number of 
observations to analyze different effects (timing, distance decay, border asymmetry 
and size asymmetry). Section 6 discusses the estimation results. As far as we are 
aware, we provide the first analysis to find, both at the urban and at the regional level, 
a beneficial influence of the EU enlargement process as measured by the growth in 
population share along the integration borders, leading to an extra growth rate of 
about 0.15 percentage points per annum. This positive integration effect declines with 
distance, is about the same for new and old members, and is more important for large 
cities and regions. Despite this positive EU integration effect associated with EU 
enlargements, being located along a border remains a burden in view of the (larger) 
                                          
3 In general, in studies like these demand linkages between cities or regions are strong, but the 
geographical reach is limited, which motivates why especially border cities might experience 
fundamental changes in market access, rather than an economy wide sample of cities (Bosker and 
Garretsen, 2010) The positive border effect of EU integration 
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general negative border effect. We do not find similar positive border-integration 
effects as a result of the introduction of the euro. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2  EU enlargement and the introduction of the Euro 
European integration has many faces, but two developments in recent years stand out: 
EU enlargement with new member states and the introduction of the Euro (see 
Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2009 or Van Marrewijk, 2007 for more details). The European 
economic integration process started after WWII with the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), established in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris. As the name 
indicates, the ECSC was an agreement related to specific sectors and established free 
trade among the member countries for the (at that time very important) coal and steel 
sectors only. Although the strengthening the economic integration process was 
initially aimed to reduce the probability of future wars, one of the most important 
consequences of the development of the EU is to increase economic integration.   
Many important enlargement steps were taken to this end as summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1  Overview of European Union enlargement process 
1951  ECSC  European Coal and Steel Community 
  Membership  Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, and 
W. Germany 
1957  EURATOM  European Atomic Energy Community 
1957  EEC  European Economic Community 
1967  EC  European Communities; combining ECSC, EEC, and 
EURATOM 
1973  Membership  + United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark 
1981 Membership  +  Greece 
1986  Membership  + Spain and Portugal 
1990  Membership  + East Germany (reunification of West and East Germany) 
1993 EU  European  Union 
1995  Membership  + Finland, Austria, and Sweden 
1999  EMU  Economic and Monetary Union 
2002  Euro  Introduction of the euro 
2004 Membership  + Cyprus, Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia. 
2007  Membership  + Bulgaria and Romania. The positive border effect of EU integration 
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Figure 1 describes the changes in the size of the EU in terms of the population 
involved. The vertical axis measures the total size of the population of the member 
states. The jumps in the line indicate that each EU enlargement increases the total 
affected population abruptly. Associated with this process is the simultaneous 
abolishment of a border in an economic sense, resulting in a sudden drop of 
transaction costs across borders. In this respect, especially the first enlargement in 
1973 (with Denmark, Ireland and the UK), the third enlargement in 1986 (with Spain 
and Portugal), and the Eastern enlargement in 2004 (with ten new members along the 
eastern border of the EU) stand out. The total population of the EU is now close to 
500 million people, making it one of the largest integrated markets in the world. For 
our analysis it is important to note that enlargements substantially increase the 
(potential) market access for the EU members.  
 
Figure 1 Historical expansion of the European Union, 1951-2010 
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The second experiment we look at is the introduction of the Euro. This was the 
culmination of a process – after the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system in 1972 – 
via fixed exchange rates to a single currency in Europe. The history was a succession 
of successes and failures within the European Monetary System, but finally 
governments agreed on the introduction of the Euro, and as of January 1, 2002 Euro The positive border effect of EU integration 
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coins and notes were introduced.
4 The Maastricht treaty stipulates that certain macro-
economic criteria have to be met, related to government debt, inflation, etc., before 
countries can introduce the Euro. In practice this implies that a sub-set of countries 
that are a member of the EU also belong the Euro-area.
5 Also the introduction of the 
Euro can be viewed upon as an integration experiment reducing barriers to trade such 
that the potential market access of those involved increases. A priori, the effects of 
this experiment can be expected to be smaller than for economic integration because 
ever since the fall of the Bretton-Woods system, European policy makers aimed (with 
mixed success) at more or less fixed exchange rates, and in practice border cities were 
often accustomed to ‘dual’ exchange rates for day-to-day payments (that is, coins and 
bills of different denominations often circulated in border cities). In addition, the 
introduction of the Euro took place in 2002 (or, technically, in 1999) as the Euro-
members already enjoyed a very high degree of economic integration.      
 
The central question in this paper is if indeed border cities or regions are more 
affected by the reduction in transaction costs that go along with EU integration. As in 
Hanson (2001) and Redding and Sturm (2008) we expect that especially cities and 
regions along the border benefit disproportionally from the increased (export) market 
access. However, as is also stressed by Overman and Winters (2006), increased 
(export) market access is not the only force experienced by border cities or regions. 
Increased (import) competition could work in the opposite direction. In the New 
Economic Geography (NEG) models this is the so called price-competition effect. 
The net effect has to be determined empirically. Arguably, the integration experiments 
we analyze are less spectacular than the German division studied by Redding and 
Sturm (2008) and the variation in the data following an integration shock is expected 
to be smaller than for the German division in 1949. Redding and Sturm (2008), 
mention that economic integration might be endogenous and developments related to 
changes in market access might induce changes in economic integration. However, it 
is not clear how especially border cities ore regions could induce these international 
policy changes. Furthermore, we use a much larger sample of cities and regions in 
substantially more countries than Redding and Sturm (2008), such that the lack of 
                                          
4 Formally the Monetary Union started in 1999. 
5 In 2010 the Euro-area consists of Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, 
Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Finland. The positive border effect of EU integration 
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variation in the data caused by the two experiments which we study is compensated 
by a larger number of observations.  
 
Following the integration shock, the question arises how long the effect lasts. Based 
on the estimates of Redding and Sturm (2008) for border cities in Germany, we 
initially take this duration to last about 40 years.
6 With respect to the EU enlargements 
it took more than 20 years, after the creation of the ECSC in 1951, before the first EU 
enlargement occurred in 1973 (see Table 1). This implies that the first enlargement in 
1973 and all subsequent enlargements fall within the 40 years duration period. Since 
our city sample starts in 1979 and the first change  (needed for the empirical 
specification, see below) is only observed in 1989, the duration period of 40 years has 
effectively elapsed for the founders of the EU. Consequently, no border integration 
effects are active between France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands for the period of observation. All other border integration changes, 
including that of the introduction of the Euro, are active for the entire sample period 
of observation once they occurred. 
 
3 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework is based on a multi-region version of Helpman’s (1998) 
geographical economics model, as used in Redding and Sturm (2008). As usual in 
these models (see Brakman, Garretsen, and van Marrewijk, 2009 Ch. 3-4), the 
combination of increasing returns to scale and transport costs leads to agglomeration 
forces as firms want to locate production near large markets (home market effect) and 
consumers want to live in large markets (consumer love of variety and transport costs 
result in a low cost of living effect). At the same time, the model exhibits spreading 
forces as a plethora of competitors in a large market make less-crowded locations 
more attractive (competition effect) and (in this specific model) a large market raises 
the costs of an in-elastically supplied, non-traded local amenity, thus leading to higher 
costs of living near large markets (congestion effect). The tug of war between the 
agglomeration and spreading forces in the model determines the distribution of 
population among the available locations.   
 
                                          
6 We also include some sensitivity analyses with respect to the duration of the integration effect. The positive border effect of EU integration 
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The economy consists of a number of locations or areas  } ,.., 1 { A a∈ , where the areas 
can be either cities or regions. Each area has an exogenous stock  a H  of non-tradable 
amenity in elastic supply, referred to as housing in Helpman (1998). The number of 
consumers or laborers L is mobile across locations and each supplies one unit of 
labor in-elastically, spends a share  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ μ  of income on horizontally differentiated 
varieties and the remaining share  μ − 1  on the non tradable amenity. The production 
of varieties takes place under increasing returns to scale (with fixed cost and constant 
marginal cost in terms of labor) and is based on monopolistic competition with a 
constant elasticity of substitution between varieties of  1 > ε  (Dixit and Stiglitz, 
1977).
7 There are iceberg transport costs for varieties, such that  1 > i a T  units must be 
shipped from location a to make sure one unit arrives in location i.  
 
The population of areas is endogenously determined by migration decisions of 
workers between locations to ensure that the same real wage holds in all populated 
areas in the long-run equilibrium. If we let  a w ,  a L , 
M
a P ,  a n , and  a p  be the (nominal) 
wage rate, the number of laborers, the Dixit-Stiglitz price index for varieties, the 
number of varieties produced, and the local (free on board) price of such a variety (all 
at location a), respectively, then it can be shown (see also Redding and Sturm, 2008) 
that the equilibrium real wage, that holds for all areas, can be reformulated as an 
equilibrium population  a L  of area a, that equals: 
(1)  () ( ) a
MA C




i i i a H T p n T P L w L
a a
)] 1 )( 1 /[( 1 ) 1 ( / 1 ) ( ) / )( (
− − − − − ∑ ∑ Ω =
ε μ μ ε μ ε μ ε
4 4 43 4 4 42 1 4 4 4 43 4 4 4 42 1
, 
where  Ω is a function of parameters and the common real wage. The terms  a FMA  
and  a CMA  denote firm market access and consumer market access, respectively. Firm 
market access  a FMA  measures the proximity of firms located in a to the demand 
from all markets, including the market of its own location (depending on labor income 
in a location, the associated price index, and the transport costs of getting goods from 
a to all markets). It determines the wage rate that firms can afford to pay in zero 
profit equilibrium and combines both the home market effect and the competition 
effect mentioned above (if surrounding areas are characterized by relative low price 
                                          
7 In principle, it is straightforward to include more increasing returns industries, each with a different 
elasticity of substitution. Thus, large cities or regions can host more industries than smaller cities. The positive border effect of EU integration 
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indices, the current location faces more competition and is less attractive. The more so 
for high elasticities of substitution and low transportation costs). Consumer market 
access  a CMA  measures consumer’s ease of access to tradable varieties (depending on 
the number of varieties produced in a location, the locally charged price, and the costs 
of getting goods from there to a). It captures the cost of living effect mentioned 
above. Finally, the term  a H  (stock of non-tradable amenity) is associated with the 
congestion effect. Note that the model assumes labor mobility (resulting in real wage 
equalization for all areas, a).
8 It is well-known that labor mobility in the EU is 
relatively limited. This implies that if integration, or for that matter any shock, has 
some impact on La this is additional evidence of the strength of the forces at work. 
 
Equation (1) clarifies that locations in the vicinity of national borders that pose 
significant obstacles to trade flows (leading to high trade costs  ai T ) have lower firm 
and consumer market access and thus lower population levels in long-run equilibrium. 
Redding and Sturm (2008) thus take the division between East and West Germany 
after WWII until the reunification in 1990 as an example of a shock that creates a 
border effect. They calibrate the above model and show that (i) cities close to the 
border decline in population through changes in Tai and Taj in equation (1) above (an 
effect that diminishes as the border distance increases), and (ii) the border effect is 
weaker for larger cities as these – initially home to a larger set of industries than 
smaller cities – are able to specialize and access export markets more readily than 
smaller cities. Their empirical estimations find strong support for (i) and (ii).  
 
Our emphasis in this paper is on a reverse policy shock, instead of division we will 
thus look at integration. The European integration process strives to reduce 
international obstacles between countries (leading to lower trade costs  ai T ). On the 
one hand, the process of European integration is arguably more gradual and its impact 
on border locations not as strong as abrupt and severe as the German division after 
WWII. One would thus expect the impact on border population size to be smaller and 
harder to find for the EU integration process. On the other hand, the number of 
countries, regions, and cities involved in the EU integration process is considerable 
larger than for the case of the German division (see the next section), such that if there 
                                          
8 See Redding and Sturm (2008, p. 1772), equation (1). The positive border effect of EU integration 
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is  an economically meaningful impact we should be able to find it. Following 
Redding and Sturm (2008) our main hypothesis is thus as follows: 
I.  Cities or regions that are close to an abolished border as a result of EU 
integration shock (in casu EU enlargement or the introduction of the euro)  
experience a relative population increase.  
Based on the discussion above, we can also formulate sub-hypotheses IIa-c: 
II.  a)   The border effect is different for large and small border cities or regions. 
b)  The border effect is stronger for EU enlargement compared to the 
introduction of the euro. 
c)   The border effect gets weaker when the distance from the border increases.  
 
Whether the border effect is indeed positive remains to be seen. Redding and Sturm 
(2008) stipulate that the market access effect will be dominant, but NEG theory is 
inconclusive as competition effects counter-act the home market effect. The net effect 
has to be determined empirically. Brakman, Garretsen, and Van Marrewijk (2009, ch 
11) provide an illustration of the forces at work in a related simulation experiment as 
they show that ‘building a bridge’ between two locations in a multi-location NEG 
setting affects all locations, but those near the ‘bridge’ (or in the present case, near a 
disappearing border) are affected the most. The simulations indicate that the 
competition effect for standard parameter values does not dominate the other forces 
and that integration benefits the border areas. 
 
4  Data  
We collected two basic non-balanced panel data sets: one for European cities, using 
data from Brinkhoff (http://www.citypopulation.de) and another for European regions, 
using data from Eurostat.
9 For the analysis in this paper we included information from 
34 European countries, leading to a total number of 1,457 regions and 2,410 cities, see 
Table 2 for a list of countries and the number of regions and cities for each country. 
Note that these numbers are neither proportional to a country’s total population nor to 
its size. France, for example, has only a limited number of cities included in the data 
set, while Germany has a large number of regions compared to other countries. 
Consequently, in our sample Germany and France have more regions than cities, 
                                          
9 See the data appendix for a detailed description of the data. The positive border effect of EU integration 
10 
which is in contrast to the other countries under consideration that have more cities 
than regions in the sample. Seven countries in Table 2 are not current EU member 
countries (although some are candidate countries, see Figure 2 below), these are 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, and 
Switzerland (in the estimations we differentiate between EU countries only, and all 
countries). Note that Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia are only 
included in the city analysis, while Macedonia is only included in the region analysis. 
The other 30 countries are included both in the city as well as in the region analysis.  
 
Table 2 Included countries with # of regions and # of cities 
Country   # regions # cities  Country   # regions  # cities 
Austria 35 75  Luxembourg 1  28 
Belgium 44 113  Macedonia  8  34 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  n.a. 24  Malta  2  30 
Bulgaria 28 43  Montenegro  n.a.  25 
Croatia 21 28  Netherlands  40  121 
Czech Republic  14 56  Norway  19  52 
Denmark 11 72  Poland  66  177 
Estonia 5 30  Portugal  30  94 
Finland 20 59  Romania  42  42 
France 100 39  Serbia  n.a.  62 
Germany 429 155  Slovakia  8  42 
Greece 51 54  Slovenia  12  43 
Hungary 20 67  Spain  59  75 
Ireland 8 54  Sweden  21  125 
Italy 107 128  Switzerland  26  102 
Latvia 6 32  Turkey  81  133 
Lithuania 10 50  UK  133  146 
Total #  1,457 2,410       
 
Figure 2 depicts the various EU countries and candidate EU countries in 2010. The 
analysis focuses on classic border integration effects, meaning that we focus on land 
connections. Furthermore, borders areas (cities or regions) are only defined as border The positive border effect of EU integration 
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areas if at some point in the history of our sample they are affected by an integration 
shock. An example is Germany. Border areas along the Dutch-German border are 
excluded as they experience no integration shock with respect to integration since the 
entry of The Netherlands and Germany into (the forerunner of) the EU already took 
place in 1951. However, border areas along the German-Polish border are included in 
the definition of border areas as they are affected by integration (in 2004). For the 
case of the Euro shock we follow the same procedure (implying that for the Euro 
shock border areas along the Dutch German borders are included in the border 
definition).  
 
Figure 2 The European Union in 2010 
 
Source: http://europa.eu  
 
As is clear from Figure 2 (and Table 3 below), most EU enlargements were related to 
land borders. However, there are enlargements related to crossing sea borders, such as 
UK – France or Denmark – Sweden.
10 Focusing on land borders, we still have to 
determine when a region or city classifies as a border region or city that is affected by 
                                          
10 A sensitivity test with respect to non-land borders is available upon request; this does not affect the 
results mentioned in the main text. The positive border effect of EU integration 
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EU integration. For regions this is simple: if two regions in different countries are 
contiguous at a land border that is affected in the EU integration process, they classify 
as a border region. For cities we have to specify some cut-off distance and a way of 
measuring it in order to classify as a border city. In the baseline setting, we include all 
cities with a maximum road distance of 70 km (which is different from an ‘as the 
crow flies’ distance) to the affected border as border cities.
11 Other road distances (50 
km and 85 km) are part of our sensitivity analysis. 
 
Table 3 Overview of affected continental land borders in sample period 
  Affected border of enlargement between 
Enlargement year  Country 1  Country 2 
1973  Denmark   West Germany 
1981 n.a.  n.a. 
1986  Spain   France  
  Spain   Portugal  
1990  West Germany  East Germany 
1995  Sweden   Finland  
  Austria   Germany (west) 
  Austria   Italy  
2004  Estonia   Latvia  
  Latvia   Lithuania  
  Lithuania   Poland  
  Poland   Germany (east) 
  Poland   Czech Republic 
  Poland   Slovakia  
  Czech Republic  Germany  
  Czech  Republic  Austria  
  Czech  Republic  Slovakia  
  Hungary   Slovakia  
  Hungary   Austria  
  Hungary   Slovenia  
  Slovenia   Austria  
  Slovenia   Italy  
2007  Romania   Hungary  
  Romania   Bulgaria  
  Bulgaria   Greece  
 
Combining the map information in Figure 2 with the timing and EU enlargement 
schedule in Table 1, and the sample period shown in Figure 1, we have a complete 
overview of all affected EU enlargement borders and their starting year over the entire 
                                          
11 The road distance was measured manually for all cities using Google Maps; data available on request The positive border effect of EU integration 
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sample period.
12 As noted above, the effect remains operative until the end of the 
observation period once it starts. The table shows that there was/were: 1 affected 
border in the 1973 enlargement, no affected borders in 1981, 2 affected borders in 
1986, 1 affected border in 1990, 3 affected borders in 1995, 14 affected borders in 
2004, and 3 affected borders in 2007. The majority of EU integration activity thus 
concentrates towards the end of the period, although some cities and regions are 
affected throughout the entire period.  
 
Figure 3 Average annual compounded population growth rates
* 














* border refers to the EU integration cities and regions, not the euro cities and regions 
 
Table A1 in the appendix provides some basic information on the different types of 
cities and regions identified in the EU integration process. The average city size in the 
EU (110k) is both larger than the non-EU cities (82k) and larger than the size of the 
cities along the EU integration border (93k). The same holds for the median city size, 
which is 51k for EU cities, 26k for non-EU cities, and 33k along the integration 
border. When calculating the average annual compounded growth rates (in per cent), 
we observe (see Figure 3) that the smaller non-EU cities grow faster than the larger 
EU cities, namely 1.35 per cent compared to 0.35 per cent. More interesting for this 
study, however, is the fact that the cities along the EU integration border grow even 
slower (0.12 per cent), which makes it a priori unlikely to find positive EU integration 
effects. The analysis below, however, distinguishes between the general border effect 
(which is expected to be negative) and the EU integration border effect (which is thus 
                                          
12 Note that we exclude the only non-continental land border between Ireland and the UK affected by 
EU enlargement. Including it does not affect our results. The positive border effect of EU integration 
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expected to be positive). Since the negative general border effect typically turns out to 
be stronger than the (temporary) positive EU integration border effect, the net border 
effect is negative (as illustrated in Figure 3). Similar observations hold for the 
regional data, since (i) the average population size of EU regions (374k) is larger than 
along the integration borders (296k), (ii) the median size of EU regions (251k) is 
larger than along the integration borders (181k), and (iii) the average growth rate of 
EU regions (0.17 per cent) is larger than along the integration borders (-0.09 per cent). 
The non-EU regions again grow more rapidly (0.35 per cent) than the EU regions (see 
Figure 3).
13 In all cases, the growth rate of regions is smaller than the growth rate of 
the concomitant cities, indicative of a general process of urbanization.  
 
5  Empirical strategy 
To investigate the hypotheses discussed in section 3, we use a difference-in-
differences methodology by comparing the growth performance of European areas 
close to a border abolished during the EU integration process (treatment group) to the 
growth performance of other European areas (control group). Consequently, we focus 
on the distribution of population over the regional or urban system within each 




at at at pop pop share / 
(where C  is the country index) be the share of the population in the regional or urban 
system. Our baseline empirical specification is as follows:
14 
(3)  at C t at a a t s t a D d n integratio border border h sharegrowt ε γ β + + + × + = − ) ( , ,  , 
where  t s t a h sharegrowt , , −  is the annualized rate of growth (per cent) in the population 
share of area a from time period  s t −  to t;  a border  is a dummy equal to one when an 
area is a member of the border group as a whole and zero otherwise
15; let 
{} 1 = ∈ ≡ a border A a B , then  t a n integratio  is a dummy equal to one at time t if 
                                          
13 The size of non-EU regions is larger than the size of EU regions (in contrast to the size of cities), 
namely an average of 624k and a median of 314k.  
14 The link between equations (1) and (2) can be seen by log-differentiating (1). The 
border×integration dummy captures the combined effect of changes in FMA and CMA caused by 
changes in transport costs. The implicit assumption is that the integration dummy captures the effects 
on population growth through: the price index, market size (wages*initial population), and the number 
of varieties (firms). The main concern when considering econometric biases in estimates like these are 
omitted variables. To some extent the dummy variables (fixed effects) deal with this. Below we deal 
separately with the FMA term in the sense that smaller cities might experience an integration shock 
differently than large cities (that might already be home to important export industries). 
15 See section 4 on the definition of affected cities or regions. The positive border effect of EU integration 
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B a∈  and an EU integration border within its reach was abolished at most 40 years 
ago. A similar reasoning applies to the case of the introduction of the euro. In this way 
we can distinguish within the border group as a whole, whether the selected group of 
border regions or cities that experience European integration (or the introduction of 
the Euro) perform differently from those not affected by European integration (or the 
introduction of the Euro). Furthermore,  t d  is a full set of time dummies;  C D  is a full 
set of country dummies; and  t a ε  is the error term. Note that the term  t a n integratio  
does not only depend on time but also on location.
16 This is caused by the fact that 
during the EU history several borders were abolished at different locations and 
different time periods, see Table 3 for an overview. This dummy is therefore, for 
example, equal to zero for cities along the Austria-Italy border (either in Austria or in 
Italy) until 1994 and equal to one from 1995 onwards.
17 Equation (2) allows for 
unobserved fixed effects in area population levels which are differenced out by 
computing growth rates. The time dummies control for common macroeconomic 
shocks affecting the population growth throughout Europe and trends in population 
growth rates. The country fixed effects take care of unobserved heterogeneity between 
countries, as our areas are part of different national (urban) systems with different 
policies (for example regarding the extent to which they stimulate activity in border 
areas). The coefficient β  captures any systematic difference in population growth 
rates of border areas versus other areas. The key coefficient is γ , on the interaction 
between border areas and EU integration and the relative performance of population 




6 Estimation results 
6.1  EU Enlargement 
The baseline estimation results for both urban- and regional population share growth 
rates are given in Table 4. Columns (1) and (3) provide the results when information 
from all countries with available data are included, while columns (2) and (4) restrict 
                                          
16 In contrast to Redding and Sturm (2008). 
17 Similarly, for an Austrian city such as Linz (close to both the German and Czech Republic border), 
this dummy is equal to zero up to 1994 and equal to one from 1995 onward (as part of Austria-
Germany border region) and equal to one from 2004 onward (as part of the Czech Republic-Austria 
border region), that is the dummy is one until 2043 (for a period longer than 40 years). For our period 
of observation, this time extension beyond 40 years is never an issue. The positive border effect of EU integration 
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attention to data from EU countries only (thus slightly narrowing the size of the 
control group). The results are virtually the same in all cases. The first line indicates 
that border areas are indeed poor performers relative to more central locations. The 
population share growth rate is -0.21 percentage points per year for border cities and  
-0.31 percentage points for border regions. Our key coefficient of interest on the 
interaction between border areas and EU integration ( at a on integrati border × ), is given 
in the second row of the table. The effect is positive and highly significant. As a result 
of the integration process, the population share growth rate for border areas rises by 
about 0.15 percentage points, both for cities and regions. On the one hand, this is an 
indication of the success of the EU integration process. On the other hand, we observe 
that it is not sufficient to reverse the relative decline of border areas, neither for cities 
nor for regions. 
 
Table 4 Urban and regional population share growth rates; baseline estimates 
  Urban population  Regional population 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
a border   - 0.210
*** -  0.227
*** -  0.312
*** -  0.314
*** 
 (0.0549)  (0.0568)  (0.0415)  (0.0418) 





 (0.0499)  (0.0516)  (0.0542)  (0.0561) 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample cities / regions  all cities  all cities  all regions  all regions 
Sample countries  all countries  EU countries all countries  EU countries 
Observations 6,286  5,239  23,096    20,670
 
2 R   0.050 0.064 0.043    0.032 





Our definition of affected border cities is based on an across-the-road travel distance 
to the border of 70 km. This is, of course, to some extent an arbitrary measure, 
although it is in line with the extent of distance effect found by Redding and Sturm 
(2008) for the German division process. Table 5 provides the baseline estimates for 
urban population share growth for two alternative distance measures, namely 50 km The positive border effect of EU integration 
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and 85 km across-the-road travel distance to the border.
 18 The results are in line with 
our previous findings, with  at a on integrati border ×  effects positive and highly 
statistically significant, in the range of 0.11 to 0.17 percentage points rise per year. 
Again, this is not sufficient to offset the relative decline of border cities. 
 
Table 5 Urban population share growth rates; variations in distance 
  50 km border  85 km border 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
a border   - 0.176
*** -  0.191
*** -  0.145
*** -  0.168
*** 
 (0.0550)  (0.0561)  (0.0548)  (0.0537) 





 (0.0613)  (0.0623)  (0.0706)  (0.0689) 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample regions
  all cities  all cities  all cities  all cities 
Sample  countries  all EU all EU 
Observations 6,286  5,239  6,286  5,239 
2 R   0.050 0.062 0.049 0.062 





Naturally, this raises the question on the spatial reach of the  at a on integrati border ×  
interaction effect, recall hypothesis IIc. The answer is given in Table 6, where we 
subdivide the border cities into cities (i) within the range of 50 km from the border, 
(ii) within the range 50 to 70 km from the border, and (iii) within the range of 70 to 85 
km from the border. For the first two types of cities, the  at a on integrati border ×  effect 
is positive and significant. For the third type of cities (within the range 70 to 85 km 
from the border), the  at a on integrati border ×  is positive, but not statistically 
significant. This leads us to conclude that we can safely restrict attention to cities 
within the 70 km range, which is in line with the findings of Redding and Sturm 
                                          
18 The table reports the results for urban population share of columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 for the 
alternative specification of a 50 km and 85 km border distance. We also looked at all borders in the 
sample, i.e. not only the border areas that are affected by a shock. Also those border cities are adversely 
effected by the border location, but less so (by a factor two) than the border cities at the affected 
borders. Border regions along the borders of these core EU members show a small positive effect.. The positive border effect of EU integration 
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(2008). Note that this implies that our regional estimates include a collection of border 
cities (within the 70 km range) as well as non-border cities (outside the 70 km range). 
In addition, we constructed an artificial border to see if the estimates are statistical 
artifacts. To this end we selected, at random, 416 cities and 306 regions end defined 
these as border areas (the same numbers as in the sample). Next, we repeated the 
estimates for this random border sample for integration shocks. The treatment group 
and timing was also constructed at random. The results (see appendix II) indicate that 
this exercise resulted in non-significant outcomes, both for border areas in general as 
well as for the treatment group. 
 
Table 6 Urban population share growth rates; extent of distance effect
19 
 (1)  (2) 
a border   - 0.200
*** -  0.219
*** 
 (0.0584)  (0.0605) 
km at a n integratio border
50 ×   0.124
** 0.163
*** 
 (0.0552)  (0.0575) 
km at a n integratio border
70 50− ×   0.194
*** 0.242
*** 
 (0.0702)  (0.0719) 
km at a n integratio border
85 70− ×   0.115 0.138 
 (0.125)  (0.125) 
Year effects  Yes  Yes 
Country effects  Yes  Yes 
Sample cities
  all cities  all cities 
Sample countries  all countries  EU countries 
Observations 6286  5239 
2 R   0.051 0.064 





The next effect we analyze is the duration of the  at a on integrati border ×  effect, which 
is taken to be 40 years in the baseline scenario. To do that, we created four separate 
dummy variables, each covering a period of 10 years after the abolishment of an EU 
                                          
19 The table reports the results for individually exclusive distances for the baseline 70 km specification. The positive border effect of EU integration 
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border. The dummy variable 
years at a on integrati border
20 10− × , for example, equals one 
if an EU border was abolished for the respective border area between 10 and 20 years 
ago (and zero for the other time dummies). As Table 3 shows, the border between 
Spain and France was abolished in 1986. This implies that for the cities and regions 
along the Spain – France border the variable 
years at a on integrati border
20 10− ×  is equal to 
one in the period 1996 – 2005. Table 7 shows that for border cities the 
at a on integrati border ×  effect is operative (positive and significant) for a period of 
about 20 years. This is significantly shorter than the (opposite) effect on the duration 
of the German division found by Redding and Sturm (2008), which lasts for 40 years. 
We think that the impact of the much more dramatic shock experienced in Germany is 
responsible for this longer duration, but the limited number of observations we have 
for the EU integration effect for time periods of more than 20 years also plays a role.
20 
The results in Table 7 on the duration of the EU integration effect are a bit less 
straightforward for the regional data, which indicates that this effect is positive and 
significant for the 0 – 10 years and 20 – 30 years periods and not significant for the 
other periods. The inclusion of both border and non-border cities in the border region 
data may partially explain this finding.  
 
                                          
20 As Table 3 shows, only the German-Danish border generates observations within the 30-40 years of 
duration, leading for both cities and regions to a limited number of observations in this range.  The positive border effect of EU integration 
20 
Table 7 Urban and regional population share growth rates; timing effect estimates 
  Urban population  Regional population 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
a border   - 0.200
*** -  0.219
*** -  0.288
*** -  0.290
*** 
  (0.0561) (0.0583) (0.0411) (0.0414) 
years at a n integratio border





  (0.0528) (0.0544) (0.0542) (0.0558) 
years at a n integratio border
20 10− ×   0.154
** 0.204
***  - 0.0911  - 0.0961 
  (0.0699) (0.0721) (0.0613) (0.0623) 
years at a n integratio border
30 20− ×   - 0.0149  - 0.00675  0.604
*** 0.604
*** 
  (0.154) (0.154) (0.185) (0.189) 
years at a n integratio border
40 30− ×   - 0.0189  - 0.00752  0.209  0.202 
  (0.261) (0.261) (0.172) (0.170) 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample cities / regions  all cities  all cities  all regions  all regions 
Sample  countries  all EU all EU 
Observations 6,286  5,239  23,096  20,670 
2 R   0.050 0.064 0.044 0.033 
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Table 8 Urban and regional population share growth rates; small and large areas  
All countries  EU countries  a. Urban population 
share growth rates  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
a border   - 0.350
***  - 0.120  - 0.352
*** -  0.145 
 (0.0641)  (0.0898)  (0.0646)  (0.0953) 




 (0.0720)  (0.0715)  (0.0728)  (0.0779) 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample cities
a  large  cities small  cities large  cities small  cities 
Sample countries  all countries  all countries  EU countries  EU countries 
Observations 3,248  3,036  2,908  2,331 
2 R   0.065 0.112 0.085 0.109 
All countries  EU countries  b. Regional population 
share growth rates  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
a border   - 0.403
***  - 0.101  - 0.406
*** -  0.103 
 (0.0479)  (0.0842)  (0.0486)  (0.0821) 
at a n integratio border ×   0.209
*** 0.0448 0.214
*** 0.0471 
 (0.0629)  (0.0968)  (0.0655)  (0.0934) 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample regions
b  large regions  small regions large regions  small regions
Sample countries  all countries  all countries  EU countries  EU countries 
Observations 16,314  6,782  15,060  5,610 
2 R   0.033 0.112 0.034 0.048 




a Large is bigger (and small is less) than median of earliest observations, where earliest observation is 
the earliest year population data are available for the city 
b  A region is large if it includes a city whose population size exceeds the median of cities. 
 
Table 8 analyzes the difference in economic impact of EU integration for cities and 
regions of different size, see hypothesis IIa. We define a city to be large if its earliest 
observation exceeds the median of all earliest observations and to be small otherwise. 
A similar procedure for regions would lump together large geographical areas or The positive border effect of EU integration 
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regions with many small cities or with one big city as ‘large’ regions. Instead, we 
opted for a more coherent definition, in which a region is large if it includes a city 
whose population size exceeds the median of cities. Table 8 shows that the overall 
positive EU integration effect for border areas is driven by the results for large 
cities/regions. For small cities/regions the integration effect is usually not even 
statistically significant, and the same hold for the border dummy as such. This differs 
from the findings of Redding and Sturm (2008, table 7, p.1794) for the reunification 
of Germany, which is arguably a smaller shock than the German division. They find 
some evidence that the reunification had positive effects, but differentiating between 
large and small cities results in [p.1793]: ‘coefficients substantially smaller in 
magnitude than for the division and are not statistically significant at conventional 
levels.’ Be as it may, for our sample we find that larger cities and regions are the ones 
that receive a positive integration thereby confirming hypothesis IIa. 
 
Table 9 Urban and regional population share growth rates; asymmetry: old and new 
members since 2004 
  Urban population  Regional population 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
a border   - 0.212
*** -  0.229
*** -  0.298
*** -0.300
*** 
  (0.0536) (0.0557) (0.0406) (0.0409) 





  (0.0611) (0.0611) (0.0512) (0.0521) 





 (0.0622)  (0.0645)  (0.103)  (0.109) 
Year  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample cities / regions  all cities  all cities  all regions  all regions 
Sample countries  all countries  EU countries  all countries  EU countries 
Observations 6,286  5,239  23,096    20,670
 
2 R   0.050 0.064 0.043 0.032 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01; 
** p<0.05; 
* p<0.1;  art border  refers to an artificially 
created border, see the main text for details. 
 The positive border effect of EU integration 
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Finally, Table 9 analyzes asymmetric border effects, where we disentangle the border 
effects for the existing EU members and the new entrants, specifically for the 
substantial enlargements in 2004 and 2007. Note again that for instance German cities 
along the Polish border are included as border cities of the existing EU member 
Germany and German cities along the Dutch or French border are included as non-
border cities. As the table indicates, our main results are not affected. More 
specifically: (i) there is a significant and negative general border effect and (ii) there 
is a significant and positive border-integration effect, both for the border cities of the 
old and new EU members, like for instance German cities along the Polish border and 
vice versa respectively. The table also shows that the border effect is about the same 
at the city level for old and new members, while it is higher for the new members than 
for the old members at the regional level.
21 We attribute this difference again to the 
more coherent unit of observation at the urban level than at the regional level. 
 
6.2 The introduction of the Euro 
The second integration experiment described in section 2 is that of European 
monetary integration, ultimately resulting in the introduction of the euro for 12 
countries in 2002 (enlarged in the period 2007-2011 to 17 countries).
22 As already 
discussed above, the additional effects of the introduction of the euro on the market 
access variables of border cities or regions compared to non-border cities or regions 
(which ultimately determines location decisions) are expected to be smaller than the 
additional effects of the EU integration process as measured by accession, see 
hypothesis IIb. Not only is the euro related to a smaller part of the economic forces, 
but also (and more importantly) monetary unification was a much more gradual 
process with many decades of experimentation with fixed or managed exchange rates 
and a long period of adhering to strict rules before the actual introduction of Euro 
coins and bills in 2002 took place. Our results are summarized in Table 10, which 
shows that (i) the population share growth rates are significantly smaller along the 
borders of the euro area (about 0.13 per cent for cities and 0.20 per cent for region) 
and (ii) there is no discernable positive effect on these growth rates that can be 
                                          
21 At the city level an F-test for equality of the border-integration coefficients for old and new members 
cannot be rejected at any standard significance level. In contrast, this equality hypothesis is rejected at 
the 5 per cent level for the regional estimates. We also estimated old and new border effects for the 
whole period and found similar results. 
22 Or 20 countries if one includes San Marino, Monaco, and the Vatican. The positive border effect of EU integration 
24 
attributed to the introduction of the euro.
23 Border cities and regions have no benefits 
in terms of their population growth share growth from introducing the euro.  
 
Table 10 Urban and regional population share growth rates; introduction of the euro  
  Urban population  Regional population 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
euro border   - 0.132
*** -  0.138
*** -  0.208
*** -  0.204
*** 
 (0.0450)  (0.0459)  (0.0286)  (0.0283) 
at euro euro border ×   - 0.0105  0.0132  - 0.0470  - 0.0623 
 (0.0577)  (0.0580)  (0.0451)  (0.0456) 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample cities / regions  all cities  all cities  all regions  all regions 
Sample countries  all countries  EU countries all countries  EU countries 
Observations 6,286  5,239  23,096  20,670 
2 R   0.050 0.062 0.043 0.032 





7  Conclusion 
Urban historians have shown that the evolution of cities follows a relatively stable 
path (Bairoch, 1988). At the same time, long time series on city population also reveal 
that (sub-sets of) cities can leap-frog to new development paths. Relatively recently, 
discretionary policy changes or natural experiments have been used to shed light on 
what drives these changes in the development of (sub-sets of) cities and to investigate 
whether they are, indeed, stable after a shock or policy change. Redding and Sturm 
(2008) analyze the effects of the post WWII division of Germany into East and West 
Germany in 1949 on border cities along the new border between the two Germany’s. 
They find that the effects of the German division on the cities along the border were 
substantial, resulting in a sharp decline of the population along the new border (more 
so for small than for large cities).  
 
                                          
23 Note that the selection of border cities and regions for the introduction of the euro is quite different 
from that of the EU integration (accession) process, and in particular includes cities and regions along 
the borders of the countries that started the process: France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg. Taking 1999 instead of 2002 as the starting year for the early 11 countries involved does 
not change our results. The positive border effect of EU integration 
25 
We apply the methodology developed by Redding and Sturm (2008) to the case of the 
EU enlargements that took place from 1973 onwards, which can be expected to affect 
especially border cities as these cities experience larger changes in market access than 
cities further away from the border. We also analyze regional data and look at the 
effects of the introduction of the Euro on border locations. Both at the urban and 
regional level, we find a beneficial influence of the EU integration process as 
measured by the growth in population share along the integration borders, leading to 
an extra growth rate of about 0.15 percentage points per annum. The positive 
integration effect associated with EU enlargements holds on both sides of the 
integration border, is active for a limited distance (up to 70km) and time period (up to 
30 years), and is driven by the larger cities and regions. Despite this positive EU 
integration effect, being located along a border remains a burden in view of the 
(larger) general negative border effect. We do not find similar positive border-
integration effects as a result of the introduction of the euro. In short, we find support 
for our hypotheses I and II from in section 3. 
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Appendix I Data description 
The data consist of two non-balanced panel data sets on location and population, one 
for European cities and one for European regions. The data for European cities were 
collected from Brinkhoff (http://www.citypopulation.de/), whereas the data on the 
European regions were obtained from Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/). The 
urban population data covers the period from 1979 to 2010, with irregular intervals. 
The regional data cover the period from 1990 to 2008, with only a few missing 
observations. Border regions are defined as regions that have a common border with a 
neighboring EU country. The location of cities was collected from Google maps 
(http://www.maps.google.com/). Border cities are cities within a road distance of 70 
kilometers from the nearest national border(s). We also experimented with border 
cities within 50 kilometers and 85 kilometers road distance from a national border. 
The total number of cities is 2410, namely 1950 EU cities and 460 non-EU cities 
(Table A1.a). Out of the 1950 EU cities 416 (21 per cent) are border cities (using the 
70 kilometers border distance). The regional data set consists of 1457 regions, namely 
1302 EU regions and 155 non-EU regions. Out of the 1302 EU regions 306 (24 per 
cent) are border regions (see Table A1.b).  
 
Table A1 Basic urban and regional information (EU integration) 
a. Urban data   Population    growth
* 
 #  cities  mean  median  rate  (%) 
EU Cities   1,950  110,484  50,984  0.351 
Non-EU cities  460  82,483  26,066  1.355 
All Sample Cities    2,410  105,631  44,956  0.542 
EU integration border cities (70 km) 416  93,054  32,891  0.119 
b. Region data   Population    growth 
 #  regions  mean  median  rate  (%) 
EU Regions   1,302  373,760  251,000  0.168 
Non-EU regions  155  624,317  314,200  0.346 
All Sample regions (total)   1,457  398,679  256,000  0.187 
EU integration borders  306  296,173  180,900  -0.094 
* average annual compounded growth rate (%), based on beginning and end value 
  The positive border effect of EU integration 
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Appendix II Random border  
Table A2 reports the effects of an artificially created border from a random selection 
of 416 non-border cities and 306 non-border regions (equal to the number of border 
cities or regions). The start of the integration period for each city or region was 
chosen randomly from one of the periods relevant for this country
25 and active 
henceforth. As the table shows, creating this artificial border effect within the EU 
does not lead to any significant border effects. 
 
Table A2 Urban and regional population share growth rates; artificial border 
  Urban population  Regional population 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
art border   0.0529 0.121 0.0293  0.0494 
  (0.0781) (0.0928) (0.0347) (0.0391) 
t art art n integratio border , ×   0.0308 -  0.0285 0.0241 0.00897 
 (0.0920)  (0.106)  (0.0509)  (0.0543) 
Year  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample cities / regions  all cities  all cities  all regions  all regions 
Sample countries  all countries  EU countries  all countries  EU countries 
Observations 6,286  5,239  23,096    20,670
 
2 R   0.049 0.062 0.041 0.030 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01; 
** p<0.05; 
* p<0.1;  art border  refers to an artificially 
created border, see the main text for details. 
 
 
                                          
25 For countries not actively affected by integration in the whole period, such as Belgium, the nearest 
border effect was chosen, in this case 1995. The list is available on www.charlesvanmarrewijk.nl  